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 i 
ABSTRACT 
 
 This publication presents the current limited liability recreation statutes in the 
Northeastern states and analyzes changes in these statutes over the last 15 years or so.  Particular 
attention is given to the Northern Forest States of New York, Vermont, New Hampshire, and 
Maine.  For these four states, court cases have been reviewed as well as the state statutes.  A 
comparison of the statutes across states, with court cases serving as a background, allows the 
author to provide an appraisal of the status of the statutes in each of the four states and to offer 
suggestions for changes that would broaden or solidify the coverage of the statutes in the 
Northern Forest states.  Major changes that have occurred in some states over the last 15 years 
include (1) broadening coverage of the statutes to include not only recreation activities but also 
trail construction and maintenance as well as a variety of other scientific, research, educational, 
and aesthetic uses; and (2) allowing the owner or occupant to receive some compensation and 
still have limited liability immunity under the statute.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 For many decades sportspersons have depended heavily on private lands for recreation.  
Because of the variety of habitat on private lands, including cropped land, fallow fields, brush, 
and woodlots, game has typically been more abundant on private than public lands, and most 
hunting has occurred on private lands (Decker and Brown 1979).  Private land access has also 
been important historically for fishing, and most states in the Northeast have had programs for 
several decades in which easements have been purchased from private owners to allow access to 
rivers, streams, and lakes for fishing. 
 
 More recently, access to private lands has become increasingly important in the Northern 
Forest states (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York) for trails for hiking, 
snowmobiling, cross-country skiing, and use of all-terrain vehicles.  For these activities, trails of 
many miles are often needed, and such trails in most cases can be developed only if parts of them 
pass through private lands.  In other situations, access to private land is needed for portaging 
canoes and kayaks and for a variety of other types of outdoor recreation.  The need for private 
lands for recreation is important not only to recreationists themselves.  The supply of lands 
available for recreation also has economic importance to local communities; it affects businesses 
that serve both local residents and tourists who visit areas of the Northern Forests to participate 
in outdoor activities.   
 
 Gaining access to private lands for recreation has been a problem for multiple reasons.  
Landowners want some control over who uses their property and when it is used.  Many owners 
either have direct experience, or know another owner who has experienced damage to their 
property from hunters or other recreationists (Siemer and Brown 1993).  Beyond these concerns, 
a major obstacle to gaining access to private lands for recreation has been the liability (both 
perceived and real) that landowners potentially face for recreationists who are injured on their 
property.  State legislatures have realized that landowners who allow recreationists on their 
property are providing a public service, and they began in the 1950s and 1960s to pass legislation 
limiting the liability of landowners who allow recreationists on their property free of charge or 
other considerations.  All states now have such statutes, and the statutes in many states have been 
amended over the years to cover additional types of recreation and other non-commercial uses.   
 
 The objective of this study was to examine the current recreation use statutes of the four 
Northern Forest States to analyze the extent of their liability coverage, and to suggest additional 
refinements or amendments that would be useful to provide further protection to landowners.  
Recreation use conflicts, posting of private lands, and the importance of recreational access to 
private lands was examined in the Northern Forest states over a decade ago (Brown 1994), but 
has not been examined comprehensively since then.  Several states have amended their statutes 
in the intervening years. 
 
 The focus of this effort is on access to private lands, but because the New York statutes 
provide some protection for public lands, analysis of that protection is also included in this study.  
The analysis uses two primary tools: 
1.  A comparative analysis of coverage in the four Northern Forest States and other northeastern 
states (whose case law is not analyzed as it is for the Northern Forest states), and 
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2.  An analysis of more recent court cases for the Northern Forest states.  The inclusive dates of 
this analysis vary by states because the dates of modification of each state’s recreation use 
statues vary.  However, relevant court cases for each state were examined at least from 1990 
to the present.  An analysis of these court cases demonstrates (1) situations in which the 
statutes were ruled to be in effect and a summary judgment or other action was declared in 
favor of the defendant landowner; and (2) situations that the courts deemed to be beyond the 
coverage of the recreational use statutes.  It is not clear from these court cases whether 
subsequent suits were brought and owners were found liable, but these cases help demonstrate 
the limits to the statutes in each state. 
 
 Based on these analyses, suggestions are made for future considerations each state might 
wish to consider if it wishes to provide additional types of liability protection for landowners and 
others who have the authority to make decisions about access, or to fill in some of the gaps that 
courts have ruled that the current statutes do not cover.    
 
 This analysis is limited to the state-level recreation use statutes, and to cases that have 
been decided in state courts.  It is likely that the majority of cases are settled out of court.  This 
analysis also does not include cases from federal properties such as national parks and national 
forests.  However, a cursory review of federal district court records between 1990 and 2006 
involving Acadia National Park, the Green Mountain National Forest, and the White Mountain 
National Forest, revealed only two cases involving injury from a recreation activity. 
 
  
NEW YORK 
 
Statute, Status, and Description 
 
 New York became the second state in the nation, after Michigan, and passed its initial 
limited liability statute under the Conservation Law in 1956, providing basic liability protection 
to owners who allowed hunting, fishing, trapping, and training of dogs on their property.  
General Obligations Law (GOL) 9-103 has existed in its basic form since 1963.  Additional 
recreation and other activities have been added, as well as a special section pertaining to farms, 
in more recent years.   GOL 9-103 has not been amended since 1984, although amendments are 
proposed in the New York Legislature nearly every year. 
 
 
GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW   
ARTICLE 9.  OBLIGATIONS OF CARE   
TITLE 1.  CONDITIONS ON REAL PROPERTY 
  
NY CLS Gen Oblig § 9-103  (2006) 
 
§ 9-103.  No duty to keep premises safe for certain uses; responsibility for acts of such users 
 
   1. Except as provided in subdivision two, 
 
   
 3
a. an owner, lessee or occupant of premises, whether or not posted as provided in section 11-
2111 of the environmental conservation law, owes no duty to keep the premises safe for entry or 
use by others for hunting, fishing, organized gleaning as defined in section seventy-one-y of the 
agriculture and markets law, canoeing, boating, trapping, hiking, cross-country skiing, 
tobogganing, sledding, speleological activities, horseback riding, bicycle riding, hand gliding, 
motorized vehicle operation for recreational purposes, snowmobile operation, cutting or 
gathering of wood for non-commercial purposes or training of dogs, or to give warning of any 
hazardous condition or use of or structure or activity on such premises to persons entering for 
such purposes; 
 
b. an owner, lessee or occupant of premises who gives permission to another to pursue any such 
activities upon such premises does not thereby (1) extend any assurance that the premises are 
safe for such purpose, or (2) constitute the person to whom permission is granted an invitee to 
whom a duty of care is owed, or (3) assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to 
person or property caused by any act of persons to whom the permission is granted. 
 
c. an owner, lessee or occupant of a farm, as defined in section six hundred seventy-one of the 
labor law, whether or not posted as provided in section 11-2111 of the environmental 
conservation law, owes no duty to keep such farm safe for entry or use by a person who enters or 
remains in or upon such farm without consent or privilege, or to give warning of any hazardous 
condition or use of or structure or activity on such farm to persons so entering or remaining. 
This shall not be interpreted, or construed, as a limit on liability for acts of gross negligence in 
addition to those other acts referred to in subdivision two of this section. 
  
2. This section does not limit the liability which would otherwise exist 
 
a. for willful or malicious failure to guard, or to warn against, a dangerous condition, use, 
structure or activity; or 
 
b. for injury suffered in any case where permission to pursue any of the activities enumerated in 
this section was granted for a consideration other than the consideration, if any, paid to said 
landowner by the state or federal government, or permission to train dogs was granted for a 
consideration other than that provided for in section 11-0925 of the environmental conservation 
law; or 
 
c. for injury caused, by acts of persons to whom permission to pursue any of the activities 
enumerated in this section was granted, to other persons as to whom the person granting 
permission, or the owner, lessee or occupant of the premises, owed a duty to keep the premises 
safe or to warn of danger. 
  
3. Nothing in this section creates a duty of care or ground of liability for injury to person or 
property. 
********************* 
 
   GOL 9-103 lists the specific activities that are covered.  The law protects owners and 
lessees/occupants of premises who do not accept a “consideration” for allowing recreational use, 
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except that it allows considerations to be given by the state or federal government.  A separate 
section protects owners and lessees of farms from users and does not appear to restrict uses to the 
above list of activities. 
 
 GOL 9-103 indicates that property owners who give permission for their lands to be used 
does not extend any assurance that the property is safe for such use, and that extending 
permission does not elevate the user to the status of an invitee.  The law holds except for cases of 
“willful or malicious failure to guard or to warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or 
activity,”  and for situations in which a recreationist who was given permission causes injury to a 
person for whom the owner or lessee owed a duty of care (i.e., a paying customer or other person 
under the care of the owner, but not another recreationist or person in one of the above categories 
for which the GOL indicates the owner does not owe a duty of care). 
 
 Unlike the statutes of many other states, GOL 9-103 contains no statement indicating the 
extent of coverage to municipalities, counties, and to the state for lands and waters managed by 
those entities.  As a result, many of the court cases pertaining to GOL 9-103 have involved a 
public owner.  Through these cases, New York courts now have a considerable history of 
establishing the intent of the initial legislation as applied to public entities and the degree of care 
public entities owe to recreationists under specific circumstances. 
 
Court-determined Breadth of the Statute    
 
 GOL 9-103 has held up well against court challenges for activities specifically covered 
by the statute.  This review will be limited to cases that have been heard after the last amendment 
to the GOL in 1984. 
 
Status of Owner, Lessee, or Occupant of Property 
 
 The presence of the corporate operator of a landfill on the property was sufficient for him 
to qualify as an “occupant” of the premises and to qualify for immunity under the GOL (James v 
Metro N. Commuter R. R. (1990), 166 AD2d 266).   
 
 Whether or not trail construction and maintenance groups qualify as occupants is unclear.  
In Bush v. Valley Snow Throwers Inc. of Lewis County, the Court ruled that Valley Snow 
Throwers of Lewis County Inc. is a private not-for-profit group that maintained snowmobile 
trails free of charge to the public.  They are clearly authorized to be on the property for the 
purpose of maintaining the trail, and this authorized presence is sufficient to meet the meaning of 
“occupant” in the (GOL) statute.  Thus, in the case of a snowmobile accident at a point where 
Valley Snow Throwers had re-routed the trail, Valley Snow Throwers was found to be protected 
by GOL 9-103 (Supreme Court of New York, Lewis County (2004), NY Slip Op 24555; 7 Misc. 
3d 285; 790 N.Y.S.2d 350; Appeal upheld (Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, 
Fourth Department 2006; NY Slip Op 2063; 27 A.D.3d 1177; 810 N.Y.S.2d 694; 2006 N.Y. 
App. Div. Lexis 3319).  The same Court ruled that the entity maintaining a designated 
snowmobile trail on unplowed roads qualified as an occupant (Blount v. Town of West Turin 
(2003), Supreme Court of New York, Lewis County; 195 Misc. 2d 892; 759 N.Y.S.2d 851. 
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 However, this was not the ruling in a case where the plaintiff was injured while biking 
when he fell off a footbridge that he claimed to be in disrepair.  While the Court decided in favor 
of the defendant on the ground that they had not maintained the footbridge, which was on the 
Bethpage Parkway right-of-way maintained by the State and that the defendant was not 
specifically responsible for doing so, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Long Island Greenbelt 
Trail Conference, Inc. (LIGTC) did not qualify as an occupier (Rosen v. LIGTC, Inc. (2006), 
Court of Appeals of New York, 6 N.Y. 3rd 703; 844 N.E.2d 790; 811 N.Y.S.2d 335, ).  This 
implies that had an injury occurred in an area where LIGTC had done specific maintenance, they 
might not have been accorded the protection of GOL 9-103. 
 
 
Suitability of Land for Activity: 
 
 A hunter of woodchucks struck and killed by a bull at a dairy farm was ruled to have 
gone into the pasture where the bull was located and to have assumed the risks of doing so.  The 
area was deemed suitable for hunting and the owner was deemed to be protected by the GOL  
(Olson v Brunner (1999, 4th Dept) 261 AD2d 922, 689 NYS2d 833, app den 94 NY2d 759, 705 
NYS2d 6, 726 NE2d 483). 
 
 Portions of a property operated as a landfill were ruled physically conducive to 
motorbiking so as to satisfy the first element of test for determining suitability of property for 
application of GOL 9-103 in a personal injury action arising from a motorbiking accident, where 
the plaintiff provided "abundant evidence" of past recreational use of the landfill for motorbiking 
(Albright v Metz (1996) 88 NY2d 656, 649 NYS2d 359, 672 NE2d 584). 
 
 In Bragg v. Genessee Agricultural Society (1994, 84 NY2d 544, 620 NYS2d 322),                      
the Court ruled that suitability of the property for an activity should be looked at from viewing 
the property generally and not one specific portion of the property.  Thus, GOL 9-103 was found 
applicable for property containing an abandoned railway bed suitable for off-road motorcycle 
operation, even though gravel excavation had left a 10-foot opening in the rail bed.  
 
Application to Suburban and Commercial Areas and Corporations: 
 
 GOL 9-103, while initially envisioned to apply to undeveloped lands, is not restricted to 
wilderness, remote, or undeveloped areas (Iannotti v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (1979), 74 NY2d 
39, 544 NYS 2d 308, 542 NE2d 621).  Commercial properties are not excluded from liability 
protection, and when properties such as a railroad (in this case) are conducive to public use for 
several of the listed recreational activities, the Court agreed that use of GOL 9-103 as an 
inducement for the owner to allow recreational use would further the intent of the statute.  The 
fact that the injured person using his trail bike on the railroad right-of-way was involved in 
transportation between a shopping area and his home did not eliminate the application of the 
GOL to the case--the court ruled that the activity was consistent with recreational use as well as 
transportation.   
 
 The statute was ruled to apply to a commercial golf course that neither encouraged nor 
discouraged, but allowed its property to be used in winter without charge for tobogganing  (Dean 
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v Glens Falls Country Club, Inc. (1991, 3d Dept) 170 App Div 2d 798, 566 NYS2d 104). 
 
 An individual who bought a ski lift ticket to ascend a mountain with the intent of walking 
down, and who fell and was seriously injured while descending the mountain, was ruled to fall 
within a normal definition of hiking and the GOL was ruled relevant to the ski resort owner 
(Cometti v Hunter Mt. Festivals (1997, 3d Dept) 241 AD2d 896, 660 NYS2d 511). 
 
 The Faculty-Student Association at SUNY Fredonia was ruled a private corporation and 
not a municipality, and therefore fell within the immunity of GOL 9-103 in a case in which a 
sledder was injured on the property. (Heminway v State Univ. of New York (1997, 4th Dept) 
244 AD2d 979, 665 NYS2d 493, app den 91 NY2d 809, 670 NYS2d 403, 693 NE2d 750). 
 
 The fact that a 15 to 20 acre parcel was in a suburban setting was ruled not to be a 
controlling factor and the statute was ruled applicable to a case in which a child biker was killed 
by a falling tree (Hirschler v Anco Builders, Inc. (1987, 4th Dept) 126 App Div 2d 971, 511 
NYS2d 746).  In another case involving a small lot, the GOL was ruled applicable in Suffolk 
County, where a child was injured riding a bicycle on a make-shift jumping course on an 
abandoned 60’ X 100’ vacant lot (Wiggs v Panzer (1992, 2d Dept) 187 AD2d 504, 589 NYS2d 
591). 
 
 Erie Boulevard Hydropower, L.P., a hydropower provider, was found to be covered by 
GOL 9-103 in the case of a kayaking accident on its reservoir, even though a condition of the 
defendant’s operating permit required it to allow boating (Guereschi v. Erie Boulevard 
Hydropower, L.P. (2005), Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, 
19 A.D.3d 1022; 797 N.Y.S.2d 679; 2005 N.Y. App. Div.). 
 
Duty to People Not Asking Permission; “Willful and Malicious” Threshold: 
 
 Recreational "wanderers and wonderers" partaking of activities enumerated in GOL 9-
103 are owed none of usual safekeeping duties imposed on landowners.  However, such people 
must be clearly participating in one of the listed activities for the statute to apply (Farnham v 
Kittinger (1994) 83 NY2d 520, 611 NYS2d 790, 634 NE2d 162). 
 
 While there is no automatic immunity from landowner liability under GOL9-103 on 
showing of "willful or malicious" failure to warn, inherent in such exposure to suit is a high-
threshold demonstration by the injured party to show willful intent by the landowner, which 
includes showing of particular, not inferred, malice and willfulness, and not simple negligence 
(Farnham v Kittinger (1994) 83 NY2d 520, 611 NYS2d 790, 634 NE2d 162).   
 
 Similarly, a landowner's conscious disregard and failure to warn of the obvious hazard of 
a gravel pit on land known to the owner to be used for recreational motorbiking was not 
sufficient as a matter of law to invoke the "willful and malicious" exception to the landowner's 
immunity under GOL 9-103, where there was no evidence of malice or willful intent on the 
owner's part (Bragg v Genesee County Agricultural Society (1994) 84 NY2d 544, 620 NYS2d 
322). 
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 In the case of a snowmobile fatality on a trail system on private lands in which a snow 
grooming association maintained the trail with the permission of the owner, although the 
groomer changed the location of the trail and failed to post any warning of a trail intersection, the 
court ruled that this negligence did not rise to the level of willful or malicious, and that the GOL 
applied to the groomer as an occupant of the property  (Bush v Valley Snow Travelers of Lewis 
County, Inc. (2004, Sup.) 790 NYS2d 350). 
 
Application to Posted and Unposted Property: 
 
 GOL 9-103 holds regardless of whether the property in question is open or posted with 
No Trespassing signs (Bloom v Brady (1991), 171 AD2d 910, 566 N.Y.S.2d 783; N.Y. App. 
Div. LEXIS 2618).  It also holds even if the owner has previously had trespassers ejected from 
his property (Hardy v Gullo (1986, 2d Dept) 118 App Div 2d 541, 499 NYS2d 159). 
 
Falling Within Definition of Activity Covered by Statute:  
 
 Where a bicycle rider tried to take a short-cut across a field near dark and rode into a 
drainage ditch, the Court ruled that bicycling was a covered activity even if the rider was not 
engaging in recreation, and that moreover there was no indication of malicious or willful intent 
on the part of the owner of the drainage ditch (Seminara v Highland Lake Bible Conference, Inc. 
(1985, 3d Dept) 112 App Div 2d 630, 492 NYS2d 146).   
 
 In another case involving a listed activity but one not being engaged in for a recreational 
purpose, the GOL was ruled to cover a situation in which a neighbor adjacent to an abandoned 
railroad right-of-way had built an ice and snow barrier to slow down ATV traffic.  An ATV user 
was killed and the property owner (Owasco River Railway Inc.) was sued.  The GOL was 
deemed to apply even though the ATV user was not riding for recreational purposes.  (Gardner v 
Owasco River Ry., Inc. (1988, 3d Dept) 142 App Div 2d 61, 534 NYS2d 819, app den 74 NY2d 
606, 544 NYS2d 820, 543 NE2d 85). 
 
 Also, in Cometti v Hunter Mt. Festivals, referred to above, a person who bought a ski lift 
ticket to the top of the mountain to facilitate walking down, and who was injured while 
descending, was ruled to fall within the definition of hiking. 
 
Payments and Considerations: 
 
 That GOL 9-103 does not apply when a consideration is paid was ruled to extend to 
include a sportsman’s club in which members pay an initial fee plus a monthly fee for activities 
that include cutting wood on the property, even though the plaintiff was a guest and not a paying 
member (Schoonmaker v Ridge Runners Club 99, Inc. (1986, 3d Dept) 119 App Div 2d 858, 500 
NYS2d 562). 
 
Application to Public Entities: 
 
 Understanding the applicability of GOL9-103 to the public sector is important because 
public entities in New York generally can be sued for acts of negligence.  The NY Court of 
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Claims Act, Section 8, establishes that the State of New York waives its immunity from liability 
and agrees to have its liability determined in similar manner as for actions taken against 
individuals and corporations.  Also, the General Municipal Law, Article 4, Section 50 e and i, 
establishes procedures for presenting tort claims against a county, city, town, village, fire district, 
or school district.    
 
 GOL 9-103 has been ruled by the courts to have limited application to public lands.  
Those that are undeveloped, unimproved, and unsupervised have generally been found to be 
subject to GOL 9-103.  In other situations involving winter activities on lands developed and 
supervised only for summer activities, GOL 9-103 also has been found to apply.    
 
 The role of the landowner in respect to the public’s use was ruled to be important in 
determining whether and when the GOL could be applied to state lands.  The statute was deemed 
to apply to a state park in the case of injury to a cross-country skier because the state did not 
maintain cross-country trails, provide supervision in winter, or charge an access fee (Stento v 
State (1997, 3d Dept) 245 App Div 2d 771, 665 NYS2d 471, app den (1998) 92 NY2d 802, 677 
NYS2d 72, 699 NE2d 432).  The GOL was also ruled applicable to an undeveloped state park in 
the case of a hiker’s fall at the park, in that the plaintiffs failed to show why the statute should 
not apply in that case (Myers v State (2004, App Div, 4th Dept) 782 NYS2d 326). 
 
 Similar logic was used by the Courts in applying the GOL to the NYS Canal Corp. in the 
case of an accident involving someone who fell while fishing from a terminal wall.  While 
fishing was allowed, it was not supervised (McCarthy v New York State Canal Corp. (1998, 3d 
Dept) 244 AD2d 57, 675 NYS2d 254, app den 92 NY2d 815, 683 NYS2d 174, 705 NE2d 1215 
and app den sub nom McCarthy v New York State Thruway Auth., 92 NY2d 815, 683 NYS2d 
174, 705 NE2d 1215). 
 
 Similarly, the GOL was ruled applicable to the City of Troy, when a sledder was struck 
and killed by a snowmobiler on a golf course that was not supervised in winter, and in which the 
City did not actively encourage winter recreation activities there (Perrott v City of Troy (1999, 
3d Dept) 261 AD2d 29, 699 NYS2d 783).  The GOL was also ruled to be applicable to a bike 
path used for snowmobiling in winter and owned by the Village of Akron because the Village 
did not supervise or maintain the trail in winter.  Blair v Newstead Snowseekers, Inc. (2003, App 
Div, 4th Dept) 769 NYS2d 807). 
 
 In the case of a snowmobiling accident on an unplowed town road designated for 
snowmobile use and maintained by a private non-profit organization, the Court ruled that the 
municipality was acting in its proprietary role as a landowner, that the activity was unsupervised, 
and that the municipality as owner was protected by GOL 9-103, as was the “occupant” 
authorized to maintain the trail (Blount v. Town of West Turin (2003), Supreme Court of New 
York, Lewis County; 195 Misc. 2d 892; 759 N.Y.S.2d 85).  
 
 GOL 9-103 was ruled to insulate a school district from liability when a 5-year-old child 
was injured on a toboggan during a weekend day (McGregor v Middletown Sch. Dist. No. 1 
(1993, 3d Dept) 190 AD2d 923, 593 NYS2d 609). 
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 In a case where the City of Glens Falls placed a fluorescent chain with streamers across a 
roadway previously used illegally by snowmobilers, and where a snowmobiler struck the chain 
and was killed, the court ruled that the GOL was applicable and that plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate that any negligence was willful and malicious (McCleary v. City of Glens Falls 
(2006), NY Slip Op 6122—preliminary).  
    
 
Court-determined Limitations of the Statute 
 
Limitation to Owner, Lessee, or Occupant: 
 
 GOL 9-103 did not apply to an electric company that placed a guy-wire along a railroad 
right-of-way where a motorbike rider was injured because the electric company did not qualify 
as an owner, lessee, or occupant of the premises (Adams v Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. (1993, 
4th Dept) 191 AD2d 960, 594 NYS2d 501). 
 
 Also note the inconsistency of Court rulings as to whether trail construction and 
maintenance groups qualify as occupiers in the earlier discussion on Court-determined breadth of 
the statute.  
 
Whether Activity Engaged in is Covered by the Statute: 
 
 The courts have examined the specified activities covered by the GOL carefully and at 
times have ruled an individual’s activity at the time of an accident to be outside a typical 
definition of the covered activity, in which case the statute is not applicable.  For example, in 
Gough v. County of Dutchess (1996, Misc. 2d 568; 638 N.Y.S.2d 290), a seven-year-old girl was 
injured after she walked 500 to 600 feet from a store to play on an unused train trestle, from 
which she fell and was injured.  The court ruled that GOL 9-103 covers only the specific 
activities mentioned, and that this situation did not meet the definition of hiking.  Although the 
defendant was a county government rather than a private landowner, nothing in the case 
summary suggests that the court held a higher standard of care for the County in this case than 
for a private owner.   
 
 The GOL does not apply to situations in which a defendant is not engaging in one of the 
listed activities.  A man fishing on the bank of the Hudson River adjacent to a railroad ran to the 
track in attempt to rescue his dog and was struck by a train.  The Court did not allow the 
Railroad Company the protection of GOL 9-103 because the fishing was not occurring on the 
railroad property (James v. Metro N. Commuter R. R. (1990), 166AD2d 266).  The GOL also 
does not apply to swimming, which is not a listed activity (Cramer v Henderson (1986, 4th Dept) 
120 App Div 2d 925, 120 App Div 2d 926, 503 NYS2d 207).     
 
 Vehicles are now made that can be used either on-road or off-road.  An injury to people 
in such a vehicle off-road does not automatically invoke the statute—some recreational use or 
intent must be demonstrated (Farnham v Kittinger (1994) 83 NY2d 520, 611 NYS2d 790, 634 
NE2d 162).  However, if there is a recreational use, the statute holds even for a vehicle such as a 
Land Rover (Messinger v Festa (1986, 2d Dept) 117 App Div 2d 784, 499 NYS2d 111). 
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 Although not material to the summary judgment reached for other reasons, in Gotz vs. 
State of New York (2006 N.Y. Misc.—preliminary), the court ruled that GOL 9-103 would not 
apply to a spectator at the bottom of a sledding hill at Bear Mountain State Park who was injured 
when hit by a sled. 
 
Whether Property is Suitable for the Activity: 
 
 Courts have ruled that for GOL 9-103 to apply, the property must be suitable to the 
activity in question.  In Gutchess v Tarolli ((1999, 4th Dept) 262 AD2d 1008, 691 NYS2d 817), 
the court ruled that the GOL did not apply to an accident incurred while riding a bicycle across a 
front lawn because the lawn was not a suitable place for the activity. 
 
Not Applicable to Highly Developed Areas: 
  
 Despite the ruled applicability of GOL 9-103 in some developed and commercial areas, 
the New York Supreme Court ruled in 1986 that the statute was never intended to apply to highly 
developed areas, and that it did not apply to property owned by the City of New York located in 
Westchester County, where a motorbike rider on a dirt road struck a cable strung across the 
roadway (Russo v New York (1986, 1st Dept) 116 App Div 2d 240, 500 NYS2d 673). 
 
Willful and Malicious Threshold: 
 
 The construction of a 2-wire fence with lightly-colored strands of wire across an area 
known to be used by recreational vehicles, and the failure to warn recreationists of the fence was 
judged by a jury to be sufficiently “willful” on the part of the owner that a jury found defendants 
65% liable and plaintiffs 35% liable for the occurrence of an accident on defendants' property.  
(Hummel v Vicaretti (1989) 152 AD2d 779). 
 
Limits of Applicability to Public Areas 
 
 GOL 9-103 was determined not to apply to an injured biker in a supervised municipal 
park since the statute was intended to induce private owners to open their property (Ferres v. 
New Rochelle (1986) 68 NY2d 446, 510 NYS2d 57, 502 NE2d 972).  Nor did it apply to an 
injury on a hill in a public (town) park used for sledding (Sena v Town of Greenfield (1998) 91 
NY2d 611, 673 NYS2d 984, 696 NE2d 996), or on a public golf course open to the public and 
used for winter recreation activities (English v City of Albany (1997, 3d Dept) 235 AD2d 977, 
652 NYS2d 873).  Nor did it apply to a snow tubing accident at a supervised public park 
(Rashford v. City of Utica, 2005 N.Y Slip-on 8372; 23 A.D. 3d 1000; 803 N Y.S.2d 453; 2005 
N.Y.App. Div.).  
 
 It was affirmed that the GOL does not apply to ordinary users of municipal parks (Bush v 
Saugerties (1986, 3d Dept) 114 App Div 2d 176, 498 NYS2d 563).  Also, following Bush, the 
Court ruled that GOL liability immunity does not apply to a state boat launch ramp, arguing that 
previous cases had established that the GOL does not apply to a public park or recreation facility 
open for public use (Smith v State (1986, 3d Dept) 124 App Div 2d 296, 508 NYS2d 277).  Nor 
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did it apply in a county park where a snowmobiler was killed (Meyer v County of Orange (1987, 
2d Dept) 129 App Div 2d 688, 514 NYS2d 450, app. dism’d without op. 70 NY2d 872, 523 
NYS2d 497, 518 NE2d 8).  Nor did it apply in the case of a boating-related accident at a town 
park because GOL 9-103 provided no inducement to the town to open to the public what it 
already considered part of a public park (Bennett v Town of Brookhaven (1996, 2d Dept) 233 
AD2d 356, 650 NYS2d 752).  Nor did it apply in the case of a boating accident on waters whose 
bottom was owned by a Town because the waterway was ruled to be a navigable water open to 
the public (Melby v Duffy (2003, App Div, 2d Dept) 758 NYS2d 89). 
 
 Because the intent of the GOL 9-103 is to apply to “gratuitous owners” who allow their 
property to be used, according to the Courts, the statute was ruled not to apply when an 
equestrian was injured by an uprooted tree branch on private property because the Village of Old 
Westbury had purchased an equestrian easement across the property.  Thus, the defendant 
operator, Northshore Equestrian Center Inc., was ruled to have liability for maintenance of the 
trail (Testani v Northshore Equestrian Ctr., Inc. (1992, Sup) 156 Misc 2d 1031, 595 NYS2d 
653). 
 
 The New York Supreme Court (second highest court in New York) ruled that while GOL 
9-103 has general applicability to state lands, it is less applicable in situations where public 
access was traditionally provided, and was not applicable on a trail in which an ATV user was 
killed because this was not an approved use of the trail.  In this case, NYSDEC staff stretched a 
cable that originally was painted orange and had orange streamers attached to it across a trail but 
the streamers had withered by the time of the accident.  The Supreme Court upheld a lower court 
ruling that the State and the decedent were each 50% responsible, even though the decedent 
knew ATVs were not permitted on the trail (Baisley v State of New York (1990), 163 AD2d 
502).   
 
 In Schiff v. State of New York ((2006), 818 N.Y.2d 597; 2006 N.Y.App. Div.),  the 
courts found that the State should not be shielded from liability to a canoeist who stepped on a 
sharp underwater object because the State exercised supervision over the site by requiring 
permits, maintaining the launching site during the canoeing season, and actively encouraging 
canoeing by building steps and a canoe slide to encourage canoe portaging.  Yet the court found 
that the State should not be expected to conduct a survey of the entire bottom of the area under 
water. 
 
 In the case of a rollerblading accident in an area maintained by the State, the court ruled 
that while GOL9-103 does not apply to this case because it occurred in an area supervised by a 
municipality or the State, and probably also because rollerblading is not a covered activity by 
GOL 9-103, nevertheless the rollerblade participant assumed the risks of the activity, and cracks 
in the pavement were not of sufficient hazard to find the State liable (Werbelow v. State (2005), 
Court of Claims of New York, N.Y. Slip Op. 50549U, 7 Misc. 3d 1011A; 801 N.Y.S.2d 244, 
2005, Uncorrected). 
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VERMONT 
 
Statute, Status and Description 
 
 The Vermont limited liability statute is found in Title 12 (Court Procedure): Chapter 203: 
(Limitations to Landowner Liability), Sections 5791-5795.  It was substantially revised in 1997. 
 
 
12 V.S.A. § 5791  (2006) 
§ 5791. Purpose  
 
   The purpose of this chapter is to encourage owners to make their land and water available to 
the public for no consideration for recreational uses by clearly establishing a rule that an owner 
shall have no greater duty of care to a person who, without consideration, enters or goes upon 
the owner's land for a recreational use than the owner would have to a trespasser. 
 
§ 5792. Definitions  
 
   As used in this chapter: 
   (1) "Consideration" means a price, fee or other charge paid to or received by the owner in 
return for the permission to enter upon or to travel across the owner's land for recreational use. 
Consideration shall not include: 
      (A) compensation paid to or a tax benefit received by the owner for granting a permanent 
recreational use easement; 
      (B) payment or provision for compensation to be paid to the owner for damage caused by 
recreational use; or 
      (C) contributions in services or other consideration paid to the owner to offset or insure 
against damages sustained by an owner from the recreational use or to compensate the owner 
for damages from recreational use. 
 
   (2) (A) "Land" means: 
         (i) open and undeveloped land, including paths and trails; 
         (ii) water, including springs, streams, rivers, ponds, lakes and other water courses; 
         (iii) fences; or 
         (iv) structures and fixtures used to enter or go upon land, including bridges and walkways. 
 
      (B) "Land" does not include: 
         (i) areas developed for commercial recreational uses, 
         (ii) equipment, machinery or personal property, and 
         (iii) structures and fixtures not described in subdivision (2)(A)(iii) or (iv) of this section. 
 
   (3) "Owner" means a person who owns, leases, licenses or otherwise controls ownership or 
use of land, and any employee or agent of that person. 
 
   (4) "Recreational use" means an activity undertaken for recreational, educational or 
conservation purposes, and includes hunting, fishing, trapping, guiding, camping, biking, in-line 
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skating, jogging, skiing, swimming, diving, water sports, rock climbing, hang gliding, caving, 
boating, hiking, riding an animal or a vehicle, picking wild or cultivated plants, picnicking, 
gleaning, rock collecting, nature study, outdoor sports, visiting or enjoying archeological, 
scenic, natural, or scientific sites, or other similar activities. "Recreational use" also means any 
noncommercial activity undertaken without consideration to create, protect, preserve, 
rehabilitate or maintain the land for recreational uses. 
 
§ 5793. Liability limited  
 
   (a) Land. -- An owner shall not be liable for property damage or personal injury sustained by a 
person who, without consideration, enters or goes upon the owner's land for a recreational use 
unless the damage or injury is the result of the willful or wanton misconduct of the owner. 
 
(b) Equipment, fixtures, machinery or personal property. 
   (1) Unless the damage or injury is the result of the willful or wanton misconduct of the owner, 
an owner shall not be liable for property damage or personal injury sustained by a person who, 
without consideration and without actual permission of the owner, enters or goes upon the 
owner's land for a recreational use and proceeds to enter upon or use: 
      (A) equipment, machinery or personal property; or 
      (B) structures or fixtures not described in subdivision 5792(2)(A)(iii) or (iv) of this title. 
   (2) Permission to enter or go upon an owner's land shall not, by itself, include permission to 
enter or go upon structures or to go upon or use equipment, fixtures, machinery or personal 
property. 
 
§ 5794. Landowner protection  
 
   (a) The fact that an owner has made land available without consideration for recreational uses 
shall not be construed to: 
   (1) limit the property rights of owners; 
   (2) limit the ability of an owner and a recreational user of the land to enter into agreements for 
the recreational use of the land to vary or supplement the duties and limitations created in this 
chapter; 
   (3) support or create any claim or right of eminent domain, adverse possession or other 
prescriptive right or easement or any other land use restriction; 
   (4) alter, modify or supersede the rights and responsibilities under chapters 191, animal 
control, and 193, domestic pet or wolf-hybrid control, of Title 20; under chapters 29, 
snowmobiles, and 31, all-terrain vehicles, of Title 23; under chapter 23, bicycle routes, of Title 
19; and under chapter 20, Vermont trail system, of Title 10; 
   (5) extend any assurance that the land is safe for recreational uses or create any duty on an 
owner to inspect the land to discover dangerous conditions; 
   (6) relieve a person making recreational use of land from the obligation the person may have 
in the absence of this chapter to exercise due care for the person's own safety in the recreational 
use of the land. 
 
(b) Nothing in this chapter shall create any presumption or inference of permission or consent to 
enter upon an owner's land for any purpose. 
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(c) For the purposes of protecting landowners who make land available for recreational use to 
members of the public for no consideration pursuant to this chapter, the presence of one or more 
of the following on land does not by itself preclude the land from being "open and undeveloped": 
posting of the land, fences, or agricultural or forestry related structures. 
 
§ 5795. Exceptions  
   This chapter shall not apply to lands owned by a municipality or the state. 
 
 Thus, Article 5791 specifies that the purpose of the act is to encourage owners to open 
their lands and waters for recreational uses to the public by establishing a rule that owners who 
do so for no consideration have no greater duty of care to recreationists than to a trespasser.  
Article 5792 defines terms and defines recreational use considerably more broadly than New 
York’s statute, including in addition to outdoor recreation activities and gleaning: picking wild or 
cultivated plants, nature study, visiting or enjoying archaeological, scenic, natural, or scientific 
sites, or other similar activities, as well as any noncommercial activities undertaken without 
consideration to protect, rehabilitate, or improve the land for recreational uses. 
 
 Article 5793 (a) exempts landowners of liability for the above situations except for injury 
resulting from willful or wanton misconduct; and (b) exempts landowners from liability under 
the same conditions for people who enter the property for recreational purposes and then proceed 
to use equipment, machinery, personal property, or structures and facilities on the property. 
 
 Article 5794 provides some other protections for the owner: that letting people use the 
land does not restrict the owner’s property rights; that it does not extend any assurance that the 
property is safe; and that it does not lessen users’ responsibilities to look out for their own care 
and safety. 
 
 Finally, unlike New York’s statute, Article 5795 clearly states that the act does not apply 
to lands owned by a municipality or the state. 
 
Court-Determined Breadth and Limitations of the Statute   
  
 No court cases were found after passage of the revised legislation in 1997 or in the 
preceding five years that pertained to an adult recreationist on private lands.  Whether there has 
simply been a shortage of cases involving serious injuries, or whether Vermont attorneys are 
well aware of the statute and it is therefore fulfilling its intent very well would require further 
research. 
 
 Two cases were found with a relationship to landowner liability and children.  The first 
occurred in 1996, in which a child crawled under a barbed wire fence, into a pasture containing a 
horse, and was kicked and injured by the horse.  Plaintiffs claimed the situation posed an 
attractive nuisance.  Both the trial and appeals courts disagreed—the horse had no previous 
history of aggression, and there was insufficient foreseeability of an accident to justify requiring 
the owner to child-proof the pasture.  The case briefing further explained that the attractive 
nuisance doctrine (in Vermont) is merely a detailed articulation of ordinary negligence, and that 
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a trespassing child is not entitled to a heightened standard of care by the possessor of the land  
(Zukatis by Zukatis v. Perry (1996), No. 94-593, Supreme Court of Vermont, 165 Vt. 298; 682 
A.2d 964).  Note also that a later case indicates that Vermont has not adopted the doctrine of 
attractive nuisance  (Baisley v. Missisquoi Cemetery Ass'n (1998), No. 96-433, Supreme Court 
of Vermont, 167 Vt. 473; 708 A.2d 924). 
  
 In the second case (Baisley v. Missisquoi Cemetery Ass'n & Robert Young, Sr., (1998), 
167 Vt. 473; 708 A.2d 924), three children entered a cemetery and took a ladder out of the 
cemetery to climb a tree whose branches overhung the cemetery property.   A five-year-old child 
fell out of the tree and was impaled on the spikes of the top of the fence.  The trial court had 
ruled the child a trespasser and had ruled in summary judgment for the defendant Cemetery 
Association.  The Supreme Court ruled that trespass at the time of the accident was a technicality 
since the tree was not on cemetery property, that the Cemetery Association owed a duty of 
ordinary care to the defendant, and that a jury could potentially find the Cemetery Association 
and its caretaker-employee negligent of providing this level of care.  Thus, the Court reversed the 
lower court’s order of summary judgment for the defendant.  
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NEW HAMPSHIRE 
 
Status and Description 
 
 The limited liability statutes for New Hampshire are found under the New Hampshire 
Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA), Title XVIII (Fish and Game), Chapter 212, RSA 212:34 and 
215-A:34:   
 
212:34  Duty of Care. [RSA 212:34 effective until July 1, 2006; see also RSA 212:34 set out 
below.] 
 
  I. An owner, lessee or occupant of premises owes no duty of care to keep such premises safe for 
entry or use by others for hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, horseback riding, water sports, 
winter sports or OHRVs as defined in RSA 215-A, hiking, sightseeing, or removal of fuelwood, or 
to give any warning of hazardous conditions, uses of, structures, or activities on such premises to 
persons entering for such purposes, except as provided in paragraph III hereof. 
 
II. An owner, lessee or occupant of premises who gives permission to another to hunt, fish, trap, 
camp, ride horseback, hike, use OHRVs as defined in RSA 215-A, sightsee upon, or remove 
fuelwood from, such premises, or use said premises for water sports, or winter sports does not 
thereby: 
 
   (a) Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for such purpose, or 
 
   (b) Constitute the person to whom permission has been granted the legal status of an invitee to 
whom a duty of care is owed, or 
 
   (c) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for an injury to person or property caused by 
any act of such person to whom permission has been granted except as provided in paragraph III 
hereof. 
 
III. This section does not limit the liability which otherwise exists: 
 
   (a) For willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, 
structure or activity; or 
 
   (b) For injury suffered in any case where permission to hunt, fish, trap, camp, ride horseback, 
hike, use for water sports, winter sports or use of OHRVs as defined in RSA 215-A, sightsee, or 
remove fuelwood was granted for a consideration other than the consideration, if any, paid to 
said landowner by the state; or 
 
   (c) The injury caused by acts of persons to whom permission to hunt, fish, trap, camp, ride 
horseback, hike, use for water sports, winter sports or use of OHRVs as defined in RSA 215-A, 
sightsee, or remove fuelwood was granted, to third persons as to whom the person granting 
permission, or the owner, lessee or occupant of the premises, owed a duty to keep the premises 
safe or to warn of danger. 
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IV. Except as provided in paragraph III, a person using the premises as provided in paragraph I 
or given permission as provided in paragraph II, shall not maintain an action against the owner, 
occupant, or lessee of the premises for any injury which resulted while on the premises. 
 
215-A:34  Posted Land. 
 
  I. An owner may post all or any portion of his land against use by an OHRV. Such notices may 
read "SNOW TRAVELING VEHICLES PROHIBITED" or "OHRVs PROHIBITED" or may have 
in lieu of these words an appropriate sign with the designated symbol of sufficient size to be 
readable at a distance of 50 feet indicating that use of this land is prohibited for the purpose so 
specified. Whoever without right enters such land that has been so posted shall be guilty of a 
violation. Provided, however, that failure of an owner to post his land as provided in this section 
shall not be construed as granting any license to users of OHRVs to enter said premises, nor 
shall said failure be construed as implying any duty of care to the user of an OHRV by the 
owner. 
 
II. It is recognized that OHRV operation may be hazardous. Therefore, each person who drives 
or rides an OHRV accepts, as a matter of law, the dangers inherent in the sport, and shall not 
maintain an action against an owner, occupant, or lessee of land for any injuries which result 
from such inherent risks, dangers, or hazards. The categories of such risks, hazards, or dangers 
which the OHRV user assumes as a matter of law include, but are not limited to, the following: 
variations in terrain, trails, paths or roads, surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions, bare 
spots, rocks, trees, stumps, and other forms of forest growth or debris, structures on the land, 
equipment not in use, pole lines, fences, and collisions with other operators or persons. 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
 New Hampshire also has separate trails legislation in RSA 231-A-1ff, and RSA 231-A-8 
contains the following clause on liability: 
 
 
231-A:8  Liability Limited. 
 
  I. All trails established under this chapter shall be deemed to constitute land open without 
charge for recreational or outdoor educational purposes pursuant to RSA 212:34 and RSA 
508:14, I, and the liability of owners, lessees or occupants of land affected by a trail, and of the 
municipality establishing the trail, shall be limited as set forth in those statutes. 
 
II. The liability of any person performing volunteer management or maintenance activities for or 
upon any trail established under this chapter, with the prior written approval of the body or 
organization with supervision over trail management pursuant to RSA 231-A:7, shall be limited 
as set forth in RSA 508:17, and such management shall not be deemed "care of the 
organization's premises" under RSA 508:17, IV. 
 
 
 
 
   
 18
RSA 215-A:1  Definitions. 
 
V. "OHRV" means off highway recreational vehicle. 
 
VI. "Off highway recreational vehicle" means any mechanically propelled vehicle used for 
pleasure or recreational purposes running on rubber tires, tracks, or cushion of air and 
dependent on the ground or surface for travel, or other unimproved terrain whether covered by 
ice or snow or not, where the operator sits in or on the vehicle. All legally registered motorized 
vehicles when used for off highway recreational purposes shall fall within the meaning of this 
definition; provided that, when said motor vehicle is being used for transportation purposes 
only, it shall be deemed that said motor vehicle is not being used for recreational purposes. For 
purposes of this chapter "off highway recreational vehicle" shall be abbreviated as OHRV. 
OHRVs shall not include snowmobiles as defined in RSA 215-C. 
 
 RSA508:17 provides immunity from civil liability to volunteers of nonprofit 
organizations or governmental entities if the volunteer organization has a record that the person 
in question is a volunteer, the volunteer was acting in good faith and within the scope of the 
official functions and duties of the organization, and the damage or injury was not caused by 
willful, wanton, or grossly negligent misconduct by the volunteer.  
 
 New Hampshire’s statutes, which go back to 1961, have been evolving recently—
coverage of horseback riding was added to RSA 212:34 in 2003, and Paragraph 4 was added in 
2005, effective 2006.  Paragraph II of RSA 215-A:34 was added in its current form in 2006. 
The trails liability portion was added in 1993. 
 
 Of particular note is the last section (IV) of New Hampshire’s Duty of Care Statute (RSA 
212:34), which states that except for situations in section III (willful or malicious failure to guard 
or warn against; recreation involving a consideration granted to the owner; an injury to someone 
to whom the owner owed a duty), a person using the property for recreation shall not maintain an 
action against the owner, occupant, or lessee of the premises for any injury that resulted from 
being on the premises.  
 
Court-Determined Breadth of the Statute 
 
 The limited liability statute was upheld in a 1991 case in which a diver into a lake with a 
dam hit his head on a rock on the bottom of the lake and sustained a spinal injury.  The water 
level in the lake at that time was above its mean low level.  A lower court returned a summary 
judgment for the defendant property owner, and the Supreme Court, upon appeal, agreed with 
this ruling, and pointed out that RSA 212:34 clearly stated that the owners had no duty to warn 
of this water level condition.  A technicality in this case which probably had no bearing on the 
outcome was that the State of New Hampshire apparently owns the bed of the lake, including the 
rock on which the plaintiff hit his head. 
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Court-Determined Limitations of the Statute 
 
 In a case implying a limitation to the limited liability statutes, involving a business, a 
mother went to a ski lodge as a volunteer and spectator for an event in which the daughter’s ski 
club paid over $2,000 to reserve the facility for a meet.  The mother, who paid nothing herself to 
enter the facility, fell into a crevasse and severely injured her knee.  A lower court awarded the 
ski facility a summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff did not pay any consideration.  The 
appeal court determined that the relevant fact was not whether the defendant paid a 
consideration, but rather whether or not she was on the property for a purpose related to the 
owner’s business for which the owner customarily charges.  Thus, the previous order of 
summary judgment was reversed and remanded. (Soraghan v. Mt. Cranmore Ski Resort Inc., 
(2005),152 N.H. 399; 881 A.2d 693).  
 
 In a second case, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire ruled that the statutes apply to 
opening private property to the general public and not to a private party held on private property 
(i.e., social guests).  Thus, in the case of a two-year-old child who drowned in a pond bordering 
the owner’s property, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded a trial court decision of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant.  In doing so, the court noted previous cases in 
which some liability had been found in the case of a developmentally disabled child who 
drowned in a neighbor’s man-made pond and a person who was injured diving into a defendant’s 
back-yard swimming pool.  Thus, the Court narrowly interpreted the limited liability statutes to 
apply only to situations it viewed the state legislature to intend.  (Estate of Jacob Gordon-Coutre 
v. George Brown (2005), 152 N.H. 255; 876 A.2d 196).  Note that this case contains some 
history of recreation use statutes nationally and the evolvement of case law in New Hampshire.   
 
 In a limitation of liability not specific to the above statues, Baker Brook Lodges and 
Motel has property on both sides of Route 302.  The lodge owners agreed in 1993 to house an 
Orthodox Jewish group and to allow them to conduct religious services on Saturday morning, 
knowing that many of the group would need to cross the highway.  On that morning, a five-year-
old child darted into the roadway and was hit by a car.  The Supreme Court overturned a lower 
court ruling of a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, ruling that a motel or inn has a 
special relationship with its guests.  (Kellner v. Lowney 145 N.H. 195; 761 A.2d 421, 2000). 
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MAINE 
 
Status and Description 
 
 The Maine limited liability statute, which dates in its original form from 1961, appears in 
the Maine Revised Statutes Annotated, Title 14 (Court Procedure-Civil), Part I (General 
Provisions), Chapter 7 (Defenses Generally), Section 159-A: 
 
14 M.R.S. § 159-A (2005) 
 
§ 159-A.  Limited liability for recreational or harvesting activities 
 
 
    1. DEFINITIONS. As used in this section, unless the context indicates otherwise, the 
following terms have the following meanings. 
  
     A. "Premises" means improved and unimproved lands, private ways, roads, any 
buildings or structures on those lands and waters standing on, flowing through or 
adjacent to those lands. "Premises" includes railroad property, railroad rights-of- way 
and utility corridors to which public access is permitted. 
  
     B. "Recreational or harvesting activities" means recreational activities conducted out-
of-doors, including, but not limited to, hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, environmental 
education and research, hiking, recreational caving, sight-seeing, operating snow-
traveling and all-terrain vehicles, skiing, hang-gliding, dog sledding, equine activities, 
boating, sailing, canoeing, rafting, biking, picnicking, swimming or activities involving 
the harvesting or gathering of forest, field or marine products. It includes entry of, 
volunteer maintenance and improvement of, use of and passage over premises in order to 
pursue these activities. "Recreational or harvesting activities" does not include 
commercial agricultural or timber harvesting. 
  
     C. "Occupant" includes, but is not limited to, an individual, corporation, partnership, 
association or other legal entity that constructs or maintains trails or other improvements 
for public recreational use. 
  
   2. LIMITED DUTY. An owner, lessee, manager, holder of an easement or occupant of 
premises does not have a duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others 
for recreational or harvesting activities or to give warning of any hazardous condition, 
use, structure or activity on these premises to persons entering for those purposes. This 
subsection applies regardless of whether the owner, lessee, manager, holder of an 
easement or occupant has given permission to another to pursue recreational or 
harvesting activities on the premises. 
  
   3. PERMISSIVE USE. An owner, lessee, manager, holder of an easement or occupant 
who gives permission to another to pursue recreational or harvesting activities on the 
premises does not thereby: 
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     A. Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for those purposes; 
  
     B. Make the person to whom permission is granted an invitee or licensee to whom a 
duty of care is owed; or 
  
     C. Assume responsibility or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused 
by any act of persons to whom the permission is granted. 
  
   4. LIMITATIONS ON SECTION. This section does not limit the liability that would 
otherwise exist: 
  
     A. For a willful or malicious failure to guard or to warn against a dangerous 
condition, use, structure or activity; 
  
     B. For an injury suffered in any case where permission to pursue any recreational or 
harvesting activities was granted for a consideration other than the consideration, if any, 
paid to the following: 
  
     1) The landowner or the landowner's agent by the State; or       
      2) The landowner or the landowner's agent for use of the premise on which the injury 
was suffered, as long as the premises are not used primarily for commercial recreational 
purposes and as long as the user has not been granted the exclusive right to make use of 
the premises for recreational activities; or 
  
     C. For an injury caused, by acts of persons to whom permission to pursue any 
recreational or harvesting activities was granted, to other persons to whom the person 
granting permission, or the owner, lessee, manager, holder of an easement or occupant 
of the premises, owed a duty to keep the premises safe or to warn of danger. 
  
   5. NO DUTY CREATED. Nothing in this section creates a duty of care or ground of 
liability for injury to a person or property. 
  
   6. COSTS AND FEES. The court shall award any direct legal costs, including 
reasonable attorneys' fees, to an owner, lessee, manager, holder of an easement or 
occupant who is found not to be liable for injury to a person or property pursuant to this 
section. 
******************* 
 
 The Maine limited liability statute has been updated since the last review of these statutes 
in the Northern Forest states—in 2001 and perhaps at other times.  The previous statute has been 
broadened in several ways: 
 
1.  The definition of “premises” to which the law is applicable has been broadened to include 
private ways and roads as well as railroad rights-of-way and utility corridors to which public use 
is permitted; 
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2.  In the list of recreational or harvesting activities the language (including) “but not limited to” 
has been added. 
 
3.  A definition of occupant has been added that includes a variety of entities that construct and 
maintain trails for public use. 
 
4.  Under “Limited Duty,” a sentence has been inserted specifying that the limited duty applies 
regardless of whether or not permission has been granted. 
 
5.  Under 4. Limitations on Section, Part B-2 allows a payment to the landowner or his agent for 
recreational use as long as the premises are not used primarily for recreational purposes, and as 
long as the payment is not for exclusive use of the property.  Note that Maine is the only 
Northern Forest state to have such a clause in its limited liability recreational statute.  
 
6.  Under 6, “Costs and fees,” if an owner, etc. is sued and found not liable, court costs, including 
attorneys’ fees, are awarded to that owner. 
  
Court-Determined Breadth and Limitations of the Law   
 
 No recent cases have been decided since the above changes have occurred in Maine’s 
limited liability statute.  As a result, we are forced to look at some previous cases to determine 
how the statute was previously interpreted.   
 
 Discussion in a recent court case decision refers back to Stanley v. Telcom Maine, Inc. 
((1988), 541 A2d 951, 1988).  This case involved an injury to a 14-year-old minor who was 
tobogganing in a commercial sand pit and was injured when she hit a sand mound.  The Supreme 
Judicial Court of Maine, in upholding a lower court decision of summary judgment for the 
defendant, noted that the limited liability statute applies (1) to minors, (2) to commercially 
owned areas, and (3) in attractive nuisance situations if the statute otherwise would apply. 
 
 In a 1995 case (Rogers v. Gardner (Civil Action Docket No. CV-93-566, 1995), the 
statute was ruled to apply to a hunting case, even though the hunting was for a nuisance skunk, 
as opposed to recreational hunting.  The fact that the defendant, whose property was adjacent to 
the plaintiff, who was frequently out of town, and who allowed the defendant access to his house 
to a freezer, was insufficient for this to be deemed a consideration for hunting. 
 
 The statute was also found applicable in an automobile accident on Great Northern lands 
to a person driving on those lands as part of his outfitting business, even though the plaintiff had 
paid a $15 fee to the North Main Woods Association.  The Court ruled that even if this fee could 
be considered a consideration, the plaintiff was not given exclusive access to the property, and 
the property is not used for commercial recreation purposes. (Hafford v. Great Northern Nekoosa 
Corp 687 A.2d 967, 1996). 
 
 In  Landry et al. v. Berube ((1996),Civil Action Document No. CV-94-355), the court  
ruled that the limited liability recreation statute as it existed in 1992 did not apply to an invited 
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guest who broke his leg playing volleyball on a front lawn.  The language pertaining to 
recreation activities covered under the statute has broadened since 1992, but given the intent of 
the act, which courts give substantial weight to, it is questionable whether the statute would be 
deemed to apply to this situation today. 
 
 Hauling a couch to a camp, at which point a vehicle accident occurred, was ruled to be 
pursuing the use of the camp for hunting or fishing, and to be within the provisions of the statute 
(Robbins v. Great Northern Paper Co., (1989), 557 A. 2d 614). 
 
 The statute does not apply to public lands because the motivation for the statute was to 
encourage private owners to open their lands for recreation.  (Noel v. Ogunquit, 555 A.2d 1054, 
1989). 
 
 In a case where a minor was injured while using a wood splitter, the limited liability 
statute was deemed to apply only to premises liability and not to supervisory negligence in the 
use of dangerous equipment (Dickinson v. Clark (2001), ME 49, 767A. 2d 303).  
 
 Radley v. Fish ((2004). ME 87; A.2d 1196) involved a bicycle-motorist accident that 
occurred off the defendant’s property (after the bicyclist turned off the property onto a road).  It 
was therefore ruled that the limited liability statute was not applicable. 
 
ADDITIONAL PROTECTION OFFERED BY STATUTES OF  
OTHER NORTHEAST STATES 
 A full analysis of the statutes and court cases of other Northeastern states is beyond the 
scope of this report.  However, the statutes for Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and West Virginia, Virginia were examined.  
Situations for which the statutes of these states offer additional liability protection for 
landowners beyond that provided by any of the four Northern Forest States is summarized briefly 
below. 
 
Massachusetts 
 
1.  The Massachusetts statute, Massachusetts Law, Chapter 21, Articles 17C-D, attempts first to 
cover any loopholes that might exist in applying having permission granted by an owner, lessee, 
or licensee by applying the statute to anyone with an interest in the land, waters, structures, and 
equipment who legally gives permission. 
2.  The purposes of use covered by the statute are very broad (see below). 
3.  The statute specifically applies without limitation to minors, and  
4.  The statute allows a voluntary contribution or payment if it is not connected to use of the 
land. 
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ALM GL ch. 21, § 17C   
 
§ 17C.  Limitation of Liability of Landowners Making Land Available to the Public for 
Recreational Purposes. 
 
  (a) Any person having an interest in land including the structures, buildings, and equipment 
attached to the land, including without limitation, wetlands, rivers, streams, ponds, lakes, and 
other bodies of water, who lawfully permits the public to use such land for recreational, 
conservation, scientific, educational, environmental, ecological, research, religious, or 
charitable purposes without imposing a charge or fee therefor, or who leases such land for said 
purposes to the commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof or to any nonprofit 
corporation, trust or association, shall not be liable for personal injuries or property damage 
sustained by such members of the public, including without limitation a minor, while on said 
land in the absence of wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct by such person. Such permission shall 
not confer upon any member of the public using said land, including without limitation a minor, 
the status of an invitee or licensee to whom any duty would be owed by said person. 
 
(b) The liability of any person who imposes a charge or fee for the use of his land by the public 
for the purposes described in subsection (a) shall not be limited by any provision of this section. 
The term "person" as used in this section shall be deemed to include the person having an 
interest in the land, his agent, manager, or licensee and shall include without limitation, any 
governmental body, agency or instrumentality, nonprofit corporation, trust or association, and 
any director, officer, trustee, member, employee or agent thereof. A contribution or other 
voluntary payment not required to be made to use such land shall not be considered a charge or 
fee within the meaning of this section. 
 
Article 17D additionally covers entry for removal of fuel wood when no charge is made. 
 
Rhode Island 
 
 The Rhode Island statutes are found in General Laws of Rhode Island, Title 32, Sections 
6-1 through 6-6.  Section 6-4 specifically covers lands leased to the state or any subdivision or 
agency thereof, or land in which any of these entities possesses an easement for recreational 
purposes. 
 
Connecticut  
 
 The Connecticut General Statutes, Sections 52-557f-i, also (like Rhode Island) cover 
lands leased to the State or a subdivision thereof.  
 
New Jersey 
 
 The New Jersey Statutes, Title 13, Sections 13:1B15.134-142, apply not to all owners, 
but to those who are participating in an agreement with the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection in its Open Lands Management Act.  Owners who enter into an 
“access covenant” with the State, guaranteeing open access, may receive financial assistance and 
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in-kind services from the State.  Such owners are also offered liability protection similar to that 
provided by other states.  
 
Pennsylvania 
 
 Pennsylvania Statutes, Title 68, Sections 477-1-8 include a broad definition of the 
recreation activities and enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic, or scientific site.  The 
Recreational Use definition also includes the words “not limited to” and “any of the following or 
any combination thereof:  
 
 § 477-2.  Definitions 
  
   (3) "RECREATIONAL PURPOSE" includes, but is not limited to, any of the following, or any 
combination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure 
driving, nature study, water skiing, water sports, cave exploration and viewing or enjoying 
historical, archaeological, scenic, or scientific sites. 
 
Maryland 
 
 The Maryland Code, Natural Resources Article, Title 5-1104 does not list recreation 
activities but states that the limited liability applies to those using the property for any 
recreational or educational purpose or to cut firewood for personal use. 
 
Delaware 
 
 The Delaware Statutes (Delaware Code, Title 7:5901-5907) list recreation activities as 
well as viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic or scientific sites.  However, the 
statute indicates that the liability is not limited to the listed activities. 
  
West Virginia 
 
 The West Virginia statute, West Virginia Code Chapter 19-25-1 to 19-25-5, covers 
“military training or recreational or wildlife propagation purposes.”  It also covers an owner who 
grants a lease to federal or state government, any agency thereof, or any county, municipality, or 
agency thereof. 
 
 West Virginia has also joined Maine in allowing some financial compensation to the 
owner.  Chapter 19-25-5 allows for the activities covered by the statute a payment to the owner 
not to exceed $50 per year per participant.  
 
 
ANALYSIS AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS FOR  
THE NORTHERN FOREST STATES 
 The purpose of this study has been to analyze the status of the recreational use statutes in 
the Northern Forest states and to indicate areas where limited liability might be further extended 
to owners.  Based on the above information, additional considerations are provided for each 
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state.  Each of these considerations has been adopted by at least one other Northeast state.  The 
author takes this position for two reasons (1) the fact that a specific provision has been used in 
another state contributes to the likelihood that constitutionality will not be a problem if the 
provision is passed by other states; and (2) incorporating all of the aspects of all 12 Northeastern 
states would significantly improve the liability protection for any one state. 
 
New York 
 
Activities covered:   
  
 The greatest specific weakness in the list of activities covered by GOL 9-103 is that   
swimming is not included.  Also not specifically mentioned is trail construction, improvements, 
and maintenance.  New York could consider following several other states and including all 
activities engaged in for recreational, educational, and scientific purposes as well as visits to sites 
of particular historic or cultural interest.  A further rationale for broadening the legislation is that 
there are situations in which a person who intends to, or has just completed an activity of 
hunting, hiking, etc. is injured on the property.  Depending on the specifics of the case, a court 
may rule that there is not special protection under the statute because the person was not actively 
participating in the covered activity at the time of the accident. 
 
Status of person covered by statute: 
 
 Currently the legislation applies to an owner, lessee, or occupant.  The courts have been 
inconsistent as to whether trail construction and maintenance people qualify as occupants.  New 
York may want to consider a new section or inserted language in GOL 9-103 that specifically 
covers these groups.  Moreover, one could envision situations where an owner has left his 
property for a period of time and left a friend, neighbor, or relative in charge, and such person 
has allowed another person to use the property.  In the event of an accident, the person giving 
permission, assuming he was not living on the property temporarily and thus qualifying as an 
occupant, would not be subject to the protection of GOL 9-103.  New York might consider 
broadening its statute in a similar way as Maine, by including a definition of occupant that 
includes trail construction and maintenance activities, and also by following Massachusetts and 
giving protection to anyone with an interest in the land who legally grants permission. 
 
Suitability for the activity: 
 
 Court challenges to applicability of GOL 9-103 have not been a problem for the primary 
audiences for whom the legislation was designed—owners of largely undeveloped lands.  
However, the courts have used the term “suitability” in two different aspects—in terms of 
whether the land in question was more highly developed than that for which the statute was 
designed, and also to the general suitability of the property for the activity in question.  Careful 
examination of the extent to which the property is developed and in a developed area seems quite 
appropriate.  However, it does not seem appropriate that a landowner’s access to the liability 
protection offered by the statute should be jeopardized because a recreationist chose to use a 
given property for a covered activity for which it could be successfully argued that the property 
is inappropriate.  To date this has only occurred regarding bicycling in a front yard (Gutchess v 
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Taolli).  But it could conceivably happen in other situations (e.g., a motorized recreational 
vehicle user who attempts to use property that has no trails).  Suitability is not expressly written 
into the GOL, so a clause would need to be added to ensure that the statute would apply in such 
cases. 
 
Type of Lands to which Statute Applies: 
 
 The courts have not been entirely consistent as to the types of land to which GOL 9-103 
applies.  In Russo v. City of New York and Consolidated Edison (1986), the court went back to 
the original statute passed in 1956, which applied only for hunting, fishing, trapping, and training 
of dogs, and whose accompanying legislative memorandum stated that the statute was intended 
to assist in the management and use of wildlife resources of the state.  The Court in Russo v. City 
of New York and Consolidated Edison stated that “the legislature never intended the statute to 
(apply to) premises situated in, through, or around highly developed areas, (but only to) land 
located in remote, undeveloped areas.”  Thus, the court ruled that the statute did not apply to a 
strip of land ranging from 125 to 250 feet in width that runs the entire length of Westchester 
County and perhaps beyond (obviously interrupted in places by streets and roads)   In a number 
of other cases, the courts seem to have recognized that as additional activities have been added to 
the statute in more recent years, the statute should also apply to less remote properties. 
 
 Although the statute itself does not refer to remote, undeveloped lands, the language cited 
above in Russo is there for future courts to consider if they wish to make a narrow interpretation 
based on the historic intent of the statute.  Of primary concern is that large portions of New York 
have become suburbanized or exurbanized to the extent that many holdings suitable for 
recreation activities, even if they have retained the acreage they had 50 years ago, are no longer 
in “remote, undeveloped areas.”  It is interesting that Section 1c, which pertains to farms, is 
written as though it pertains to all farms, regardless of location.  There seems to be no rational 
reason for treating farms differently from other undeveloped lands with regard to their location.  
Thus, future court cases should be watched carefully to determine whether narrow court rulings 
occur with regard to location of the property; if so, a change in the legislation may be warranted. 
 
Receipt of Consideration by Owner: 
 
 As in most other states, owners in New York are not protected under the recreation use 
statute if they receive any consideration at all directly from the recreationist or other user.  It is 
interesting that the Northern portion of the Northern Forest region has historically had the 
strongest tradition of open access of undeveloped lands, yet Maine now allows owners to receive 
a fee when the fee is not for exclusive access or when the primary use of the property is non-
commercial.  West Virginia also allows the owner to receive up to $50 per year per recreationist.  
With the majority of New York lands now posted, New York may wish to consider amending 
GOL 9-103 to allow some compensation to those who allow others to use their property.    
 
Limits of Applicability to Public Areas: 
 
 Because previous New York courts have ruled that the purpose of GOL 9-103 was to 
provide an incentive for owners to allow public use of their lands gratuitously, the statute has 
   
 28
always had limited applicability to public lands.  Public parks and other areas of any size where 
improvements have been made and where there is some degree of supervision have generally  
been ruled not to fall within the scope of the statute, while remote areas such as state forests and 
wildlife areas, or less remote areas such as golf courses that are totally unsupervised in winter, 
have generally been ruled to fall under the statute.  It should be pointed out that in any of the 
situations discussed in this report, a finding that the limited liability recreation statute is not 
applicable does not imply liability on the part of a defendant.  Rather, there is no special 
immunity that applies to these cases, and they must be reargued under common law principles.     
 
Vermont 
 
 Because of 1997 revisions, Vermont’s recreational use statute is considerably broader 
than New York’s, except that the Vermont statute does not apply to public lands.  The Vermont 
statute covers virtually all outdoor activities and also work done on properties without charge for 
conservation and other purposes.  No recent court cases are available that indicate loopholes or 
other possible exceptions to the statute that should be addressed.  Vermont might consider 
whether it would wish to allow owners to receive a voluntary gift or a small payment and still 
qualify for protection under its recreation use statute.   
  
 Although the statutes in most states were written to apply entirely or primarily to private 
lands, it is not clear why states and municipalities should have greater liability for open, 
unimproved lands that they do not supervise.  State forests and wildlife management areas are 
good examples of such lands.  Vermont and other states may wish to consider broadening their 
statutes in this respect.  Vermont statute 12 V.S.A. § 5601 holds that the State shall be liable for 
injuries to persons or property or loss of life caused by negligence of its employees in the same 
manner and to the same extent as a private person, subject to maximum liability of $250,000 to 
one person and aggregate liability of $500,000 to all persons arising out of a single occurrence. 
  
New Hampshire 
 
 The New Hampshire statutes as modified in recent years appear to be serving landowners 
well.  The number of lawsuits has been minimal, probably due to the combination of the 
tightness of RSA 212:34, including Section IV that prohibits suits against owners for injuries 
suffered by recreationists except for special circumstances involving a consideration paid to the 
owner, a willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a hazardous situation, or an injury 
to someone to whom the owner owed a duty of care. 
 
 Looking to the future, although the list of activities covered by RSA 212:34 is broad, a 
list of activities will never be all-inclusive.  Birdwatching is not listed, for example.  Scouting for 
deer without a weapon may not be considered to be hunting.  Thus, New Hampshire may wish to 
consider abandoning the list of activities and instead covering any activity done for recreational, 
educational, or scientific purposes. 
 
 The New Hampshire statute, like that of most states, holds only when the owner receives 
no consideration for use of the property.  Realizing that many owners feel some responsibility to 
show prospective recreationists the property and to exercise some supervision over its use, New 
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Hampshire may wish to consider allowing landowners to be paid either a voluntary contribution 
or some payment, as has been done in Maine, West Virginia, and Massachusetts. 
 
 The New Hampshire statute does not apply to public lands.  As indicated above in the 
considerations for Vermont, it is not clear why states and municipalities should have greater 
liability for open, unimproved lands that they do not supervise.  State forests and wildlife 
management areas are good examples of such lands.  New Hampshire and may wish to consider 
broadening their statute in this respect.  New Hampshire Statutes, Title LV, Chapter 541-B 
established a five-member Board of Claims to hear and decide claims against the state of 
$50,000 or less, and the Superior Court hears claims in excess of $50,000. 
 
Maine 
  
 Maine, from an overall perspective has the most liberal limited liability recreational use 
statute in the Northeast.  The statute does not limit the activities covered to those itemized in a 
list, and it covers environmental education and research activities.  Moreover, the statute allows 
an unlimited payment to the owner as long as the property is not used primarily for commercial 
purposes and the payment is not for exclusive use of the property.  Additionally, the statute 
directs the court to award any direct legal costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, to an owner 
or occupant who is sued but found not liable for an injury suffered in a situation in which this 
statute applies.  Only two cases were found since the statute was modified.  One case involved an 
injury off the property; the second involved an injury not related to activities covered by the 
statute. 
 
 The Maine limited liability statute (14 M.R.S. § 159-A) apparently does not apply to 
public lands (not written into the legislation but from a court ruling in Noel v. Ogunquit (1989)).  
However, another law provides broad liability immunity to owners of public lands.  Statute 14 
M.R.S. § 8104-A, Section 2, states that a governmental entity is not liable for any claim which 
results from the construction, ownership, maintenance or use of unimproved land; historic sites; 
and land, buildings, structures, facilities or equipment designed for use primarily by the public in 
connection with public outdoor recreation. 
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